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Abstract
Despite the recent trend towards greater transparency of monetary policy, in many re-
spects central bankers still prefer to speak with mystique. This paper shows that the
resulting perception of ambiguity could be desirable. Under the plausible assumption
that there is imperfect common knowledge about the degree of central bank transparency,
economic outcomes are affected by both the actual and perceived degree of transparency.
It is shown that actual transparency is beneficial but that it may be useful to create the
perception of opacity. The optimal communication strategy for the central bank is to pro-
vide clarity about the inflation target and to communicate information about the output
target and supply shocks with perceived ambiguity. In this respect, the central bank bene-
fits from sustaining transparency misperceptions, which helps to explain the mystique of
central bank speak.
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“Since I have become a central banker, I have learned to mumble with great
incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I
said.”
Alan Greenspan, in testimony to US Congress, 1987.
1 Introduction
Central banks have long been associated with secrecy. Even the recent trend towards greater
transparency of monetary policy has not dispelled the mystique with which central bankers
often speak. This paper provides an economic explanation for the role of oblique communi-
cation. Under the plausible assumption that there is imperfect common knowledge about the
degree of transparency, economic outcomes are determined by both actual and perceived trans-
parency. It is shown that it may be beneficial to combine actual transparency with perceived
opacity. The optimal communication strategy for the central bank is to provide clarity about
the inflation target, but to provide information with perceived ambiguity about the output gap
target and supply shocks. Thus, the central bank benefits from sustaining transparency mis-
perceptions, which helps to explain why transparency of monetary policy has not eliminated
the mystique of central bank speak.
Intuitively, transparency is beneficial as it reduces private sector uncertainty. However,
transparency can only be achieved through central bank communications that could upset
market expectations. Since markets respond strongest to signals that are perceived to be clear,
market volatility could be muted by creating a perception of ambiguity.
For both the central bank’s inflation and output target it is shown to be optimal to be trans-
parent because it reduces erratic responses of market expectations. In addition, it is beneficial
to be perceived to be transparent about the inflation target (e.g. by publishing an explicit
numeric target) because it aligns private sector inflation expectations with the central bank’s
target. However, it is desirable to create the perception of ambiguity about the output gap
target since it makes it easier to reach the target without upsetting inflation expectations. Sim-
ilarly, for supply shocks it is useful to combine maximum actual with minimum perceived
transparency.
In practice, many central banks have a quantitative inflation target but central bankers still
tend to be notorious for their ‘mumbling’, as is illustrated by the introductory quote. Alan
Greenspan has even used the term ‘constructive ambiguity’ to describe his style of communi-
cation. This paper establishes that the perception of ambiguity could indeed be a constructive
way to achieve transparency because it reduces volatility of market expectations.
This paper builds on two different strands of the transparency literature. There are sev-
eral papers that model monetary uncertainty faced by the public by making a parameter in
the central bank’s objective function stochastic, completely abstracting from any communica-
tion of information (e.g. Sørensen 1991, Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling 2000, Beetsma
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and Jensen 2003). Such monetary uncertainty directly increases the variability of economic
outcomes, although it could also have indirect effects such as lower average inflation.1 This
‘monetary uncertainty’ literature provides an important argument in favor of transparency,
namely that it reduces private sector uncertainty and economic volatility.
A second strand of the transparency literature explicitly models information transmission
and incorporates the static effect that the information has on the formation of private sector
inflation expectations (e.g. Cukierman 2001, Hahn 2004).2 In this ‘information approach’
transparency could be detrimental because it leads to greater fluctuations in private sector ex-
pectations and increases economic volatility. In a similar vein, Morris and Shin (2002) find
that transparency could generate greater variability when agents disregard private information
and rely on a sufficiently noisy public signal to coordinate their actions. A more comprehen-
sive review of the transparency literature is provided in the survey by Geraats (2002).
Other interesting insights on central bank mystique are provided by Goodfriend (1986) who
reviews the Federal Reserve’s defense of secrecy in response to a Freedom of Information Act
suit, including the argument that disclosure of information could be prone to misinterpretation
and cause inappropriate market reaction. In addition, Winkler (2002) discusses central bank
communication and proposes to view transparency in terms of openness, clarity, honesty and
common understanding.
The present paper synthesizes the ‘monetary uncertainty’ and ‘information’ approaches.
It allows for stochastic central bank preferences and it features public signals that convey
information about those preferences but could also generate undesirable market reactions.
The main innovation of this paper is that it relaxes the ubiquitous assumption of perfect
common knowledge about the degree of transparency. This assumption requires perceived
and actual stochastic distributions to be identical, which precludes an analysis of the role of
transparency (mis)perceptions. Furthermore, in practice it is very hard for the private sector to
know how transparent the central bank actually is because the public cannot observe how much
information the central bank withholds. Even if the private sector manages to perfectly predict
monetary policy decisions, this need not imply complete transparency since the forecasts may
have been accurate despite asymmetric information about variables relevant for (future) policy
decisions. So, it seems more realistic to allow for transparency misperceptions.
This paper deviates from the perfect common knowledge assumption by introducing asym-
metric information about the degree of transparency, which allows for a discrepancy between
actual transparency and private sector perceptions of it. The result is that both the practice and
perceptions of transparency matter for economic outcomes. It is shown that the drawbacks of
1Sørensen (1991) provides an interesting example. However, it should be noted that many of the other indirect
effects reported in this strand of the literature (including those in Eijffinger et al. (2000)) are spurious due to a
biased specification of stochastic relative preferences (Geraats 2004).
2A third strand of the literature focuses on the dynamic effect of transparency on reputation (e.g. Faust and
Svensson 2001, Jensen 2002, Geraats 2005). In this ‘reputation approach’, transparency about central bank
preferences reduces beneficial reputation effects, whereas transparency about economic shocks strengthens them.
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transparency emphasized by the ‘information’ approach stem not from the actual reduction of
information asymmetries but from private sector responses induced by transparency percep-
tions. So, it may be beneficial for perceived transparency to be less than actual transparency.
To be precise, although it is best to have perfect actual and perceived transparency about the
inflation target, for the output target and supply shocks it is desirable for the central bank to
combine actual transparency with perceived opacity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2.
First, the case with perfect common knowledge about the degree of transparency about the
central bank’s inflation and output target is analyzed in section 2.1. Subsequently, imperfect
common knowledge is introduced and the role of transparency perceptions is investigated
in section 2.2. The robustness of the results is assessed in section 3, which analyzes four
extensions to the model, including alternative social welfare functions and transparency about
supply shocks (section 3.1). It also presents a new measure of transparency (section 3.2) and
it discusses other arguments related to monetary mystique (section 3.3). Finally, section 4
concludes that there is an economic rationale for central bank communications that sustain
transparency misperceptions.
2 Model
The central bank has the objective function
U = −1
2
α (pi − θ)2 − 1
2
(1− α) (y − κ)2 (1)
where pi denotes inflation, y the output gap, θ the central bank’s inflation target, κ the central
bank’s output gap target, and α the relative weight on inflation stabilization (0 < α < 1). The
inflation target θ and output gap target κ are allowed to be stochastic with θ ∼ N (θ¯, σ2θ) and
κ ∼ N (κ¯, σ2κ), and θ and κ independent.
The economy is described by the expectations augmented Phillips curve
pi = pie + y + s (2)
where pie denotes the inflation expectations of the private sector and s is a supply shock,
which is assumed to be i.i.d. white noise with variance σ2s. For analytical convenience, the
slope of the Phillips curve is normalized to one, but this does not affect any of the qualitative
conclusions below. Furthermore, for simplicity it is assumed that the central bank directly
controls the output gap y.3 It would be straightforward to extend the model with an aggregate
demand equation that relates the output gap to an interest rate controlled by the central bank,
3Alternatively, one could assume a neo-monetarist transmission mechanism in which the central bank controls
inflation pi and faces the Lucas supply equation y = pi − pie − s, but this leads to exactly the same analytical
results as for the Keynesian transmission mechanism in the model.
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but this would merely clutter the analytical expressions without affecting any of the qualitative
results.
There are two important information asymmetries between the central bank and the private
sector. First, the private sector does not observe the central bank’s inflation target θ and output
gap target κ. Instead, it receives the public signals
ξθ = θ + ε (3)
ξκ = κ+ η (4)
where ε and η are i.i.d. white noise, ε ∼ N (0, σ2ε) and η ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
. The noise ε and η stems
from the difficulty the private sector has interpreting the central bank’s fuzzy communication.
When σ2ε = σ2η = 0, the signals ξθ and ξκ communicate θ and κ without any noise, so
the information asymmetry is eliminated and there is perfect transparency about the central
bank’s targets.
The accuracy of the signals ξθ and ξκ is described by
τ θ =
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
and τκ =
σ2κ
σ2κ + σ
2
η
(5)
respectively, where 0 ≤ τ θ, τκ ≤ 1. This measure of the actual degree of transparency fol-
lows Faust and Svensson (2002), who consider an announcement about a monetary control
error. When the signals are completely accurate (σ2ε = σ2η = 0), there is perfect transparency
(τ θ = τκ = 1) about the central bank’s targets, which is defined as a situation of symmetric in-
formation between the central bank and the private sector. A shortcoming of the transparency
measure in (5) is that a constant target (σ2θ = 0, σ2κ = 0) implies minimum transparency
(τ θ = 0, τκ = 0) regardless of the informativeness of the signal (ξθ, ξκ). This drawback can
be overcome if private sector perceptions are allowed to deviate from the actual stochastic
distributions.4
The second information asymmetry is about the degrees of transparency τ θ and τκ. The
public is unsure how transparent the central bank really is. In particular, it does not know the
actual stochastic distributions of θ, κ, ε and η. Instead, the public uses the perceived (or prior)
distributions θ ∼ N (θ¯, σ˜2θ), κ ∼ N (κ¯, σ˜2κ), ε ∼ N (0, σ˜2ε) and η ∼ N (0, σ˜2η). As a result,
the perceived degrees of transparency are given by
τ˜ θ =
σ˜2θ
σ˜2θ + σ˜
2
ε
and τ˜κ =
σ˜2κ
σ˜2κ + σ˜
2
η
(6)
where 0 ≤ τ˜ θ, τ˜κ ≤ 1. This (Bayesian) transparency measure does not depend on the actual
variances σ2θ and σ2κ, so it also applies when the central bank’s targets θ and κ are deterministic.
4The transparency measure in (5) also has the peculiar feature that it is increasing in ‘monetary uncertainty’
(σ2θ, σ2κ). This correctly reflects the relative accuracy of the signal (ξθ, ξκ), but it is an odd implication for a
transparency measure. A more general measure of transparency that does not suffer from this shortcoming is
presented in section 3.2.
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Furthermore, it describes transparency from the public’s perspective, which makes it more
relevant to understanding the behavior of the private sector.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the inflation target θ and output gap target κ are
realized but only observed by the central bank. Subsequently, the private sector receives the
public signals ξθ and ξκ, which are used to rationally form private sector inflation expectations
pie. Then, the supply shock s is realized and observed by the central bank. Finally, the central
bank sets the output gap y and the level of inflation pi is realized.
The central bank maximizes the expected value of its objective (1) with respect to y subject
to (2) and given pie. This yields the optimal output gap
y = α (θ − pie − s) + (1− α)κ (7)
The output gap is increasing in the central bank’s inflation target θ and output gap target κ.
In addition, higher private sector inflation expectations pie cause the central bank to reduce
the output gap to achieve price stability, and the same holds for a higher supply shock s.
Substituting (7) into (2) produces the level of inflation
pi = αθ + (1− α) (pie + κ+ s) (8)
Inflation is increasing in the inflation target θ, the output gap target κ, the level of private
sector inflation expectations pie, and the supply shock s.
To fully understand the role of the two information asymmetries in the formation of the
private sector’s inflation expectations, subsection 2.1 assumes that the private sector only has
asymmetric information about the central bank’s inflation target θ and output gap target κ,
but perfect common knowledge about the actual degrees of central bank transparency τ θ and
τκ. Then, in subsection 2.2 the assumption of asymmetric information about the degree of
transparency is added and the role of transparency (mis)perceptions is analyzed.
2.1 Perfect Common Knowledge
The private sector has rational expectations so it uses all available information, including the
public signals ξθ and ξκ, to form its inflation expectations pie. Taking expectations of (8) and
solving for pie gives
pie = E [pi|ξθ, ξκ] = E [θ|ξθ] +
1− α
α
E [κ|ξκ] (9)
using the fact that ξκ is uninformative about θ and ξθ about κ. Private sector inflation expec-
tations depend on the private sector’s expectations of the central bank’s inflation target θ and
output gap target κ, which it attempts to infer from the public signals ξθ and ξκ. Using (3), (4)
6
and (5),5
E [θ|ξθ] = θ¯ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
(
ξθ − θ¯
)
= (1− τ θ) θ¯ + τ θξθ (10)
E [κ|ξκ] = κ¯+
σ2κ
σ2κ + σ
2
η
(ξκ − κ¯) = (1− τκ) κ¯+ τκξκ (11)
The private sector faces a signal extraction problem and its expectation of θ (κ) equals a
weighted average of its prior belief θ¯ (κ¯) and the public signal ξθ (ξκ). For a higher degree
of transparency τ θ (τκ), the public signal ξθ (ξκ) is relatively more informative, so the private
sector attaches greater weight to it. In the case of perfect transparency, τ θ = τκ = 1 and σ2ε =
σ2η = 0, so the inflation target and output gap target are perfectly inferred: E [θ|ξθ] = ξθ = θ
and E [κ|ξκ] = ξκ = κ. In the case of complete opacity (τ θ = τκ = 0), the private sector
rationally ignores the signals so that E [θ|ξθ] = θ¯ and E [κ|ξκ] = κ¯. Substituting (10) and (11)
into (9) and using (3) and (4) gives
pie = θ¯ + τ θ
(
θ − θ¯)+ τ θε+ 1− α
α
[κ¯+ τκ (κ− κ¯) + τκη] (12)
The private sector’s inflation expectations are determined by its prior expectations θ¯ and κ¯ of
the central bank’s targets, the deviations of the central bank’s targets from the private sector’s
priors, and the noise ε and η in the public signals. The latter shows how misinterpretation
of monetary policy communications causes inappropriate market reaction. The variability of
private sector inflation expectations depends on the degrees of transparency. In particular,
Var [pie] = τ 2θσ
2
θ + τ
2
θσ
2
ε +
(
1− α
α
)2 [
τ 2κσ
2
κ + τ
2
κσ
2
η
]
= τ θσ
2
θ +
(
1− α
α
)2
τ kσ
2
κ
using the fact that (5) implies σ2ε = 1−τθτθ σ2θ and σ2η =
1−τκ
τκ
σ2κ. This shows that inflation
expectations pie are most stable when the central bank is least transparent (τ θ = τκ = 0).
Intuitively, the complete lack of transparency makes the public signal so noisy that the public
no longer relies on it and only uses its prior expectations.6
Substituting (12) into (7) and using (2) gives the levels of the output gap y and inflation pi:
y = α
[
(1− τ θ)
(
θ − θ¯)− τ θε]+ (1− α) [(1− τκ) (κ− κ¯)− τκη]− αs (13)
pi = θ¯ + (α+ (1− α) τ θ)
(
θ − θ¯)+ (1− α) τ θε
+
1− α
α
[κ¯+ (α+ (1− α) τκ) (κ− κ¯) + (1− α) τκη] + (1− α) s (14)
5This uses the fact that for two jointly normally distributed variables x and z, E [x|z] = E [x] +
Cov{x,z}
Var[z] (z − E [z]).
6This case in which private sector expectations do not incorporate any communications resembles the ‘mon-
etary uncertainty’ literature mentioned in section 1. It features deterministic private sector inflation expectations
pie and the degree of monetary uncertainty is described by σ2θ and σ2κ.
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The output gap and inflation depend on the central bank’s targets θ and κ, the private sector’s
priors θ¯ and κ¯, the signal noise ε and η, and the supply shock s. Although the degrees of
transparency τ θ and τκ influence the output gap and inflation, they have no effect on the
expected values E [y] and E [pi]. In the case of perfect transparency (τ θ = τκ = 1, so ε = η =
0), the expressions simplify to y = −αs and pi = θ + (1− α) (κ+ αs) /α, which gives the
familiar rational expectations outcome that the targets θ and κ only affect inflation and do not
influence output.
The variability of the output gap and inflation are given by
Var [y] = α2
[
(1− τ θ)2 σ2θ + τ 2θσ2ε
]
+ (1− α)2 [(1− τκ)2 σ2κ + τ 2κσ2η]+ α2σ2s
= α2 (1− τ θ)σ2θ + (1− α)2 (1− τκ) σ2κ + α2σ2s
Var [pi] = (α+ (1− α) τ θ)2 σ2θ + (1− α)2 τ 2θσ2ε
+
(1− α)2
α2
[
(α + (1− α) τκ)2 σ2κ + (1− α)2 τ 2κσ2η
]
+ (1− α)2 σ2s
=
(
α2 +
(
1− α2) τ θ)σ2θ + (1− α)2α2 (α2 + (1− α2) τκ)σ2κ + (1− α)2 σ2s
where (5) is used to substitute for σ2ε and σ2η. This shows that the output gap is most stable
when the central bank is perfectly transparent (τ θ = τκ = 1). The reason is that greater
transparency makes private sector inflation expectations more sensitive to the central bank’s
targets. For a change in the inflation target, the stronger response of private sector inflation
expectations means that a smaller adjustment of the output gap is required to reach the inflation
target. For a change in the output gap target, the output gap is adjusted by less because the
larger shift in inflation expectations hampers inflation stabilization.7 However, inflation is
most stable when the central bank is least transparent (τ θ = τκ = 0). This is due to the greater
stability of private sector inflation expectations.
To determine the optimal degrees of transparency, substitute (8) and (7) into (1), use (12)
and rearrange to get
U = −1
2
α (1− α) (pie − θ + κ+ s)2 (15)
= −1
2
1− α
α
[
α (τ θ − 1)
(
θ − θ¯)+ ατ θε+ κ¯+ (α + (1− α) τκ) (κ− κ¯) + (1− α) τκη + αs]2
When there is imperfect transparency about the inflation target (τ θ 6= 1), the deviation between
the actual target θ and the private sector’s prior expectation θ¯ affects the level of U . The prior
expectation κ¯ also matters, unless there is perfect transparency about the output gap target
(τκ = 1). So, the outcome is distorted when there is incomplete transparency.
Taking unconditional expectations of (15) and substituting for σ2ε and σ2η using (5) gives
7For the neo-monetarist transmission mechanism in which the central bank directly controls inflation, the
intuition is that greater transparency reduces inflation surprises, which makes the output gap more stable.
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the ex ante expected central bank payoff
E [U ] = −1
2
1− α
α
[
α2 (τ θ − 1)2 σ2θ + α2τ 2θσ2ε + κ¯2 + (α+ (1− α) τκ)2 σ2κ + (1− α)2 τ 2κσ2η + α2σ2s
]
= −1
2
1− α
α
[
α2 (1− τ θ)σ2θ + κ¯2 +
(
α2 +
(
1− α2) τκ)σ2κ + α2σ2s]
As a result, it would be optimal to have maximum transparency about the inflation target
(τ θ = 1) and minimal transparency about the output gap target (τκ = 0). Although trans-
parency about the inflation target increases the variance of inflation, this drawback is domi-
nated by the benefits that transparency makes the output gap more stable and brings inflation
closer to the inflation target. In addition, opacity about the output gap target makes the output
gap more volatile, but this disadvantage is more than offset by the greater stability of inflation
and the smaller deviation between the output gap and its target. The optimality of opacity
about the output gap target is similar in spirit to the result in the seminal paper by Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986), where ambiguity about the output preference parameter allows the cen-
tral bank to successfully stimulate output when it is most desirable. Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) assume that ambiguity is created through monetary control errors, whereas the present
paper assumes perfect control over the monetary policy instrument but opacity caused by im-
perfect communications.
To summarize the key results:
Proposition 1 When there is asymmetric information about the central bank’s inflation target
θ and output gap target κ, and perfect common knowledge about the degree of central bank
transparency τ θ and τκ,
(i) greater transparency (τ θ and/or τκ) increases the variability of private sector inflation
expectations pie and inflation pi, but reduces the volatility of the output gap y;
(ii) it is optimal to have maximum transparency about the inflation target (τ θ = 1) and minimal
transparency about the output target (τκ = 0).
In the next subsection, the assumption of perfect common knowledge about the degree of
transparency is relaxed, allowing for a difference between actual and perceived transparency.
2.2 Transparency Misperceptions
The assumption of perfect common knowledge about transparency has the critical drawback
that private sector perceptions are restricted to be determined by the actual volatilities σ2θ,
σ2κ, σ
2
ε and σ2η. This is problematic because it is hard for the private sector to establish how
transparent the central bank actually is. For instance, what is the noise σ2η associated with a
central banker’s speech? It could easily vary, which means that the public is unlikely to know
the level of transparency τ . So, it is realistic to allow for imperfect common knowledge about
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the degree of transparency. This has the virtue that it decouples private sector perceptions of
uncertainty from actual stochastic volatility.8
In contrast to the previous subsection, assume now that the private sector does not know
the actual stochastic distribution of the central bank’s inflation target θ and output gap target
κ, and the noise ε and η. Instead, it uses the perceived (or prior) distributions θ ∼ N (θ¯, σ˜2θ),
κ ∼ N (κ¯, σ˜2κ), ε ∼ N (0, σ˜2ε) and η ∼ N (0, σ˜2η). This gives rise to the perceived degree of
transparency τ˜ θ and τ˜κ in (6).
Note that transparency perceptions do not affect the optimization by the central bank, so
(7) and (8) continue to hold. In addition, the private sector still receives the public signals (3)
and (4), which it uses rationally to form its inflation expectations pie = E˜ [pi|ξ], where E˜ [.]
denotes the private sector expectation based on the perceived distributions of θ, κ, ε and η.
But the signal-extraction process is affected by private sector perceptions. To be precise, (10)
and.(11) are replaced by
E˜ [θ|ξθ] = θ¯ +
σ˜2θ
σ˜2θ + σ˜
2
ε
(
ξθ − θ¯
)
= (1− τ˜ θ) θ¯ + τ˜ θξθ (16)
E˜ [κ|ξ] = κ¯+ σ˜
2
κ
σ˜2κ + σ˜
2
η
(ξκ − κ¯) = (1− τ˜κ) κ¯+ τ˜κξκ (17)
So, with imperfect common knowledge about the degree of transparency, it is the perceived
transparency τ˜ θ and τ˜κ that matters for the updating of private sector expectations. As a result,
private sector inflation expectations now equal
pie = θ¯ + τ˜ θ
(
θ − θ¯)+ τ˜ θε+ 1− α
α
[κ¯+ τ˜κ (κ− κ¯) + τ˜κη] (18)
The variability of private sector inflation expectations depends on the perceived degrees of
transparency τ˜ θ and τ˜κ. But now there are two measures of variability: V˜ar [.] is based on the
perceived stochastic distribution of θ, κ, ε and η, and measures private sector uncertainty (ex
ante); and Var [.] is based on the actual stochastic distribution of θ, κ, ε and η, and measures
average volatility (ex post).
The perceived variance of private sector inflation expectations equals
V˜ar [pie] = = τ˜ 2θσ˜
2
θ + τ˜
2
θσ˜
2
ε +
(
1− α
α
)2 (
τ˜ 2κσ˜
2
κ + τ˜
2
κσ˜
2
η
)
= τ˜ θσ˜
2
θ +
(
1− α
α
)2
τ˜κσ˜
2
κ
using the fact that (6) implies σ˜2θ = 1−τ˜θτ˜θ σ˜
2
θ and σ˜2η = 1−τ˜κτ˜κ σ˜
2
κ. This shows that private sector
uncertainty about inflation expectations is smallest when the central bank is perceived to be
8In a perceptive contribution, Hahn (2004) aims to analyze transparency about the central bank’s relative
preference weight α independently of the stochastic distribution of α. However, the private sector’s ex ante
distribution and the actual distribution of α are assumed to be the same, so there is no effective separation.
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least transparent (τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0). The reason is that the perceived lack of transparency makes
the public signals ξθ and ξκ unreliable, so the private sector only uses its prior expectations θ¯
and κ¯.
The actual variance of private sector inflation expectations equals
Var [pie] = τ˜ 2θσ
2
θ + τ˜
2
θσ
2
ε +
(
1− α
α
)2 (
τ˜ 2κσ
2
κ + τ˜
2
κσ
2
η
)
=
τ˜ 2θ
τ θ
σ2θ +
(
1− α
α
)2
τ˜ 2κ
τκ
σ2κ
using the fact that (5) implies σ2ε = 1−τθτθ σ2θ and σ2η =
1−τκ
τκ
σ2κ. This shows that the volatility
of private sector inflation expectations is increasing in perceived transparency τ˜ θ and τ˜κ and
decreasing in actual transparency τ θ and τκ. Intuitively, lower perceived transparency causes
the private sector to rely less on the noisy public signals (ξθ and ξκ), and greater actual trans-
parency reduces the variance of the noise (σ2ε and σ2η), both making inflation expectations pie
less volatile.
Substituting (18) into (7) and using (2) gives the levels of the output gap y and inflation pi
for transparency perceptions τ˜ :
y = α
[
(1− τ˜ θ)
(
θ − θ¯)− τ˜ θε]+ (1− α) [(1− τ˜κ) (κ− κ¯)− τ˜κη]− αs (19)
pi = θ¯ + (α+ (1− α) τ˜ θ)
(
θ − θ¯)+ (1− α) τ˜ θε
+
1− α
α
[κ¯+ (α+ (1− α) τ˜κ) (κ− κ¯) + (1− α) τ˜κη] + (1− α) s (20)
These expressions are identical to their counterparts under common knowledge, (13) and (14),
except that the actual degrees of transparency τ θ and τκ are replaced by the perceived degrees
of transparency τ˜ θ and τ˜κ. The same holds for V˜ar [y] and V˜ar [pi] when σ2θ and σ2κ are also
replaced by σ˜2θ and σ˜2κ, so the perceived variances only depend on private sector perceptions.
The actual variance is equal to
Var [y] = α2
[
(1− τ˜ θ)2 σ2θ + τ˜ 2θσ2ε
]
+ (1− α)2 [(1− τ˜κ)2 σ2κ + τ˜ 2κσ2η]+ α2σ2s
= α2
(
1− 2τ˜ θ + τ˜
2
θ
τ θ
)
σ2θ + (1− α)2
(
1− 2τ˜κ + τ˜
2
κ
τκ
)
σ2κ + α
2σ2s
Var [pi] = (α+ (1− α) τ˜ θ)2 σ2θ + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2θσ2ε
+
(1− α)2
α2
[
(α + (1− α) τ˜κ)2 σ2κ + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η
]
+ (1− α)2 σ2s
=
[
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜ θ + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
θ
τ θ
]
σ2θ
+
(1− α)2
α2
[
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜κ + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
κ
τκ
]
σ2κ + (1− α)2 σ2s
where (5) is used to substitute for σ2ε and σ2η. The variability of the output gap and inflation
depends on both the perceived and actual degrees of transparency. In the special case in which
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τ˜ θ = τ θ and τ˜κ = τκ, the common knowledge results in section 2.1 are obtained. With imper-
fect common knowledge, the volatility of the output gap is decreasing in actual transparency
τ θ and τκ, and is minimized for τ˜ θ = τ θ = 1 and τ˜κ = τκ = 1.9 The variability of inflation is
also decreasing in actual transparency τ θ and τκ, but increasing in perceived transparency τ˜ θ
and τ˜κ. Intuitively, greater transparency corresponds to fewer inflation surprises and therefore
more output gap stability, whereas lower perceived and higher actual transparency reduces the
volatility of private sector expectations and thereby the variance of inflation.
To derive the optimal degrees of actual and perceived transparency, substitute (18) into
(15) and rearrange to get:
U = −1
2
1− α
α
[
α (τ˜ θ − 1)
(
θ − θ¯)+ ατ˜ θε+ κ¯+ (α + (1− α) τ˜κ) (κ− κ¯) + (1− α) τ˜κη + αs]2
This is identical to the expression under common knowledge, except that τ θ and τκ are re-
placed by τ˜ θ and τ˜κ, respectively. It shows that in the presence of transparency mispercep-
tions, it is the lack of perceived transparency that causes the prior expectations θ¯ and κ¯ to
exert their influence on the outcome, regardless of the stochastic distribution of the central
bank targets.
Taking expectations using the distributions perceived by the private sector yields
E˜ [U ] = −1
2
1− α
α
[
α2 (1− τ˜ θ) σ˜2θ + κ¯2 +
(
α2 +
(
1− α2) τ˜κ) σ˜2κ + α2σ˜2s]
This reflects the ex ante expectation based on private sector perceptions. It is the same as the
expression for E [U ] under common knowledge after replacing τ by τ˜ and σ2 by σ˜2.
Taking unconditional expectations based on the actual distributions and substituting for σ2ε
and σ2η using (5) yields
E [U ] = −1
2
1− α
α
[
α2 (τ˜ θ − 1)2 σ2θ + α2τ˜ 2θσ2ε + κ¯2 + (α+ (1− α) τ˜κ)2 σ2κ + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + α2σ2s
]
= −1
2
1− α
α
[
α2
(
1− 2τ˜ θ + τ˜
2
θ
τ θ
)
σ2θ + κ¯
2 +
(
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜κ + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
κ
τκ
)
σ2κ + α
2σ2s
]
This reflects the central bank’s ex ante expectation and it corresponds to the average ex post
experience. It shows that E [U ] is increasing in the actual degrees of transparency τ θ and τκ,
so that perfect transparency is optimal (τ θ = τκ = 1). In addition, E [U ] is maximized for
τ˜ θ = τ θ and τ˜κ = 0.10 So, it is best to have complete perceived and actual transparency about
the inflation target (τ˜ θ = τ θ = 1), but maximum actual transparency (τκ = 1) and minimal
perceived transparency (τ˜κ = 0) about the output gap target. Intuitively, it is desirable to
have actual transparency about the central bank’s targets because it avoids erratic reactions of
private sector expectations. Furthermore, it is beneficial to have perceived transparency about
9Formally, these results follow from differentiating Var [y] with respect to τθ, τκ, τ˜θ and τ˜κ.
10Formally, ∂ E [U ] /∂τ˜θ = −α (1− α) τ˜θ−τθτθ σ2θ and ∂2 E [U ] /∂τ˜
2
θ < 0 implies that τ˜θ = τθ is optimal,
and ∂ E [U ] /∂τ˜κ = − (1−α)
2
α
(
α+ (1− α) τ˜κτκ
)
σ2κ < 0 implies the corner solution τ˜κ = 0.
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the inflation target so that private sector inflation expectations are more responsive and become
more closely aligned with the inflation target. However, perceived transparency about the
output gap target is detrimental because the response of private sector inflation expectations
hampers the stabilization of inflation.
This shows that the optimal communication strategy is different for the central bank’s
inflation and output gap target. It is best to be transparent and unambiguously clear about
the inflation target. But for the output gap target it is desirable to provide information with
perceived ambiguity.
To summarize the results:
Proposition 2 When there is asymmetric information about the central bank’s inflation target
θ and output gap target κ, and about the degree of central bank transparency τ θ and τκ
(i) greater actual transparency (τ θ and/or τκ) reduces the variability of private sector inflation
expectations pie, inflation pi and the output gap y.
(ii) greater perceived transparency (τ˜ θ and/or τ˜κ) increases the volatility of private sector
inflation expectations pie and inflation pi, whereas the output gap is most stable in the absence
of transparency misperceptions (τ˜ θ = τ θ and τ˜κ = τκ).
(iii) it is optimal to have maximum actual and perceived transparency about the inflation target
(τ θ = τ˜ θ = 1), and maximum actual transparency but minimal perceived transparency about
the output gap target (τκ = 1, τ˜κ = 0).
A comparison with Proposition 1 reveals that the main drawback of transparency under
common knowledge, namely the greater variability of inflation, is not due to the actual degree
of transparency but the private sector’s perceptions of it. The fact that the public is better
informed is beneficial, but the correspondingly stronger response of private sector expectations
leads to undesirable inflation volatility.
3 Discussion
It is important to assess the robustness of the results above, so several extensions are analyzed
in section 3.1. Subsequently, section 3.2 addresses the limitation of τ as a measure of trans-
parency and presents a more comprehensive alternative. In addition, alternative explanations
for central bank mystique are discussed in section 3.3.
3.1 Extensions
Propositions 1(i) and 2(ii) show that transparency could have different effects on inflation and
output gap variability, which may give the impression that the desirability of transparency
depends on the weight attached to inflation versus output gap stabilization. To explore this
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issue, suppose that the central bank’s objective remains (1) but that social welfare is given by
W = −1
2
β (pi − θ)2 − 1
2
(1− β) (y − κ)2 (21)
where 0 < β < 1. So, monetary policy has been delegated to a central bank with a different
relative preference weight. For instance, α > β would amount to a ‘conservative’ central bank
that is more concerned about inflation stabilization than society (Rogoff 1985). Interestingly,
the degrees of transparency given in Propositions 1(ii) and 2(iii) that are optimal for the central
bank are also socially optimal, regardless of the weight β. More precisely, both E [U ] and
E [W ] are maximized for τ θ = 1 and τκ = 0 under common knowledge, and for τ˜ θ = τ θ =
τκ = 1 and τ˜κ = 0 with transparency misperceptions.11 The reason that β is immaterial is that
social welfare is not determined by Var [y] and Var [pi] but by E
[
(pi − θ)2] and E [(y − κ)2].
The latter are always proportional when the central bank behaves optimally according to (7)
and (8), so transparency affects them in the same way.
Suppose now that monetary policy is still delegated to a central bank that maximizes (1)
but that the social welfare function equals
W = −1
2
β
(
pi − θ¯)2 − 1
2
(1− β) (y − κ¯)2 (22)
So, again the central bank attaches a different weight to inflation stabilization. In addition,
although the targets of the central bank (θ and κ) and society (θ¯ and κ¯) are the same on
average, they typically differ due to idiosyncratic shocks (θ 6= θ¯ and κ 6= κ¯). This variation on
the basic model is analyzed in appendix A.1. With perfect common knowledge, the degree of
transparency that is socially optimal now depends on β. To be precise, τ θ = τκ = 1 is socially
optimal for α2 > β, and τ θ = τκ = 0 for α2 < β. In other words, if the central bank is
sufficiently conservative, the social optimum is transparency. Intuitively, if society cares a lot
about output gap stabilization, the benefit of greater output gap stability under transparency
outweighs the drawback of more inflation variability. This result is similar to Hahn (2004) who
considers transparency about the central bank’s relative preference weight α.
With imperfect common knowledge, perfect actual transparency about the central bank’s
targets (τ θ = τκ = 1) is socially optimal regardless of the value of β. The reason is that trans-
parency avoids erratic movements of market expectations. Regarding perceived transparency,
if the central bank is not conservative (α ≤ β), society benefits from complete perceived
opacity (τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0). Furthermore, for any other β the degree of perceived transparency in
the social optimum is strictly positive but remains less than the degree of actual transparency
(0 < τ˜ θ < τ θ and 0 < τ˜κ < τκ). Intuitively, the perception of opacity reduces the response of
market expectations to noise in the signal and therefore limits volatility.
11To see this, substitute (7) and (8) into (21) and rearrange to get W =
− 12
(
β (1− α)2 + (1− β)α2
)
(pie − θ + κ+ s)2. This is directly proportional to (15) so that E [W ] is
maximized for the same degrees of transparency as E [U ].
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Another issue is whether the conclusions depend on the assumption that the central bank’s
inflation and output gap targets follow a normal distribution. In particular, the expressions for
E [U ] in section 2 give the impression that the degrees of actual and perceived transparency τ
and τ˜ are immaterial when the targets θ and κ are deterministic (σ2θ = σ2κ = 0). The case of
constant central bank targets is more closely examined in appendix A.2. This reveals that it is
optimal to have complete perceived opacity about both targets (τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0), but maximum
actual transparency in the sense of minimally noisy signals (σ2ε = σ2η = 0). Intuitively, noisy
signals lead to inflation and output gap variability, but this effect is muted when the signals
are perceived to be opaque so that the private sector pays less attention to them. So again, it
is desirable to have maximum actual transparency but to sustain transparency misperceptions
such that perceived opacity exceeds actual opacity.
Another interesting extension is to consider transparency about the supply shock s. In
particular, suppose that the private sector receives a public signal of the supply shock before
it forms its inflation expectations pie. This is analyzed in appendix A.3. In the case of perfect
common knowledge, greater transparency τ s about the supply shock s increases the volatility
of both the output gap and inflation. Intuitively, greater transparency about the supply shock
makes private sector inflation expectations pie more sensitive to the supply shock s, so the
central bank increases the output gap response to partially offset the increased volatility of
inflation. Not surprisingly, minimum transparency about supply shocks (τ s = 0) is optimal.
This result is consistent with Cukierman (2001), who compares limited (τ s = 0) and full
(τ s = 1) transparency about the supply shock s in a model with a neo-monetarist transmission
mechanism.
With imperfect common knowledge about the degree of transparency τ s, the variance of
the output gap y and inflation pi are both minimized for minimum perceived transparency
(τ˜ s = 0) and maximum actual transparency (τ s = 1). The intuition behind this result is
familiar. Minimum perceived transparency mutes the response of private sector expectations
pie to the supply shock s, which contributes to greater stability of the output gap and inflation.
In addition, maximum actual transparency reduces the noise of the public signal, which makes
inflation expectations more stable and thereby generates less volatility in the output gap and
inflation. Not surprisingly, it is (socially) optimal to have minimum perceived and maximum
actual transparency about supply shocks (τ˜ s = 0 and τ s = 1).
So, the most effective communication strategy for supply shocks is to provide all the rele-
vant information but to downplay its relevance. Perhaps, this could explain why some central
banks (e.g. the European Central Bank) stress that the quarterly macroeconomic forecasts they
publish are staff forecasts that come without any endorsement by the monetary policymakers.
These extensions of the model show that the key findings of section 2 are robust: When the
assumption of perfect common knowledge is relaxed, actual transparency is beneficial and it
is desirable to have a perceived degree of transparency that is no greater than the actual degree
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of transparency (τ˜ ≤ τ ).12
3.2 Transparency Measures
Since the transparency measure in (5) suffers from some drawbacks, it is useful to reconsider
it. Although τ describes the relative accuracy of the signal ξ, it is less suitable as a measure
of central bank transparency because it is increasing in ‘monetary uncertainty’ (σ2θ, σ2κ). In
the literature, transparency typically refers to the absence of an information asymmetry (e.g.
Geraats 2002). So, transparency is decreasing in the extent to which the private sector faces
asymmetric information. However, an increase in opacity due to greater variability of the
central bank’s targets has the awkward implication that it leads to a higher value of τ . This
shows that (5) is not a good indicator of the degree of transparency.
Instead, it is useful to construct a more fundamental measure that is directly based on the
definition of transparency. Focusing on the inflation target θ, the private sector has the prior
θ¯ and symmetric information amounts to θ = θ¯. The difference between θ and θ¯ gives an
indication of the degree of asymmetric information. So, ex ante opacity can be described by
E
[(
θ − θ¯)2] = σ2θ, which is the ‘monetary uncertainty’ measure used in one strand of the
literature.
However, the private sector is able to use the public signal ξθ to update its prior of θ, which
leads to the posterior E [θ|ξθ] in (10). Taking into account the information conveyed by the
signal, the appropriate measure of opacity becomes
E
[
(θ − E [θ|ξθ])2
]
= E
[(
θ − (1− τ θ) θ¯ − τ θ (θ + ε)
)2]
= (1− τ θ)2 σ2θ + τ 2θσ2ε
= (1− τ θ)σ2θ
after substituting (10), (3), and using (5) to substitute for σ2ε. This shows that opacity about
θ is increasing in the amount of initial monetary uncertainty σ2θ and decreasing in the relative
accuracy τ θ of the signal ξθ.
Taking the inverse of opacity and substituting (5) leads to the transparency measure
γθ =
1
(1− τ θ)σ2θ
=
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
σ2θσ
2
ε
=
1
σ2θ
+
1
σ2ε
This measure of (actual) transparency depends positively on the relative accuracy of the signal
τ θ and negatively on monetary uncertainty σ2θ. It has the intuitive property that transparency
about θ could be enhanced in two, independent ways: (i) reduce the initial uncertainty (σ2θ),
or (ii) reduce the noisiness of the signal (σ2ε). So, γθ has the desirable property that greater
monetary uncertainty decreases transparency, which is in contrast to τ θ.
12Another extension would be to incorporate the reputation approach. Since reputation effects are based on the
updating of private sector inflation expectations, they would depend only on perceived transparency. So, actual
transparency would remain desirable and transparency perceptions would again play a key role.
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Nevertheless, γθ still has the drawbacks that it depends on the actual stochastic distribu-
tions and implies infinite transparency if θ is deterministic (σ2θ = 0). These problems can be
overcome by the following analogous measure of perceived transparency:
γ˜θ =
1
(1− τ˜ θ) σ˜2θ
=
1
σ˜2θ
+
1
σ˜2ε
If the private sector believes there is symmetric information about the inflation target θ, then
the prior variance equals σ˜2θ = 0, so that perceived transparency γ˜θ is infinite. On the other
hand, an infinitely diffuse prior (σ2θ → ∞) does not imply complete opacity (γ˜θ = 0) when
the signal is informative (so σ˜2ε is finite). Similarly, the transparency measures γκ, γ˜κ, γs, and
γ˜s can defined.
Although γ and γ˜ are better measures of the degree of asymmetric information, the eco-
nomic effects are more easily understood in terms of the relative accuracy of the signal (τ , τ˜ )
and the extent of monetary uncertainty (σ2θ, σ2κ, σ˜2θ, σ˜2κ). The reason is that the relative signal
accuracy need not have the same effect as initial monetary uncertainty. In particular, when
there is common knowledge about all the variance parameters σ2 and thereby about τ , greater
opacity through higher monetary uncertainty σ2θ, σ2κ and σ2s is always detrimental because it
increases the variance of output and inflation, Var [y] and Var [pi], and reduces E [U ].13 In
contrast, greater opacity through a lower relative signal accuracy τκ is beneficial and actually
increases E [U ].
Nevertheless, one of the main findings of the paper, namely that actual transparency is
beneficial in the presence of private sector misperceptions, not only holds for the measure τ but
also for the more general measure γ. To be precise, a decrease in initial monetary uncertainty
(σ2θ, σ2κ, σ2s) and in signal noise (σ2ε, σ2η, σ2υ) are both beneficial because of a reduction in
Var [y] and Var [pi], and an increase in E [U ].14 As a result, this conclusion remains robust
even when a more comprehensive transparency measure is used.
3.3 Central Bank Mystique
Despite all the emphasis on transparency of monetary policy nowadays, central bankers still
often speak with a remarkable lack of clarity. Although it is difficult to characterize ‘central
bank speak’, according to an insider:
“[Fed speak] is a language in which it is possible to speak, without ever saying
anything.” (Mike Moskow, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
December 7, 2002)
13This holds not only ceteris paribus (i.e. for a constant τθ, τκ and τs), but also for the total effects of σ2θ, σ2κ
and σ2s.
14This refers to the total effect, which is straightforward (though tedious) to compute by differentiatingVar [y],
Var [pi] and E [U ] after substituting for τ .
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This paper shows that a central bank may try to give this impression and create the per-
ception of opacity. This could be achieved by avoiding the publication of precise, quantitative
information and instead resorting to qualitative statements. For example, a numeric inflation
target is likely to contribute to a high degree of perceived (and actual) transparency, whereas
speeches that provide ambiguous perspectives could lower transparency perceptions.
It is worthwhile to note that the conclusions of this paper regarding the desirability of
perceived opacity are independent of the public’s prior expectation of the central bank’s output
gap target, κ¯. In particular, the results also hold for κ¯ = 0, in which case there is no average
inflation bias, so the central bank has no systematic incentive to misrepresent its information.
In that case, commitment to a truthful communication technology is perfectly credible. To the
extent that this is not possible, there may be central bank ‘cheap talk’ such that communication
of central bank private information is only credible when it is imprecise (Stein 1989).
In addition, there may be institutional reasons for central banks to be vague. For example,
a central bank without an explicit legal primary objective of price stability, such as the US.
Federal Reserve, may be more reluctant to adopt a numeric inflation target because it could
give the impression that it is neglecting its other objectives.
There could also be other reasons for oblique communications by central bankers. For
instance, evasiveness could be used to limit accountability or hide incompetence. In addition,
secretive central bankers receive more media attention as their every word is scrutinized. Last
but not least, vague communications could reflect the tremendous uncertainty faced by central
bankers, which is often difficult to explicate.
The paper shows that under certain circumstances maximum perceived opacity is optimal.
In principle, there are two ways to achieve this. The central bank could give the impression
that the public signal ξ is infinitely noisy so that τ˜ = 0. Alternatively, the central bank could
remain silent and not communicate at all so that ξ ∈ {∅} and pie = E [pi]. In the latter case,
the actual and perceived degree of transparency always coincide: τ = τ˜ = 0. In practice, few
central bankers prefer to remain silent, but rather engage in oblique speak. This still gives them
the benefits of perceived opacity, while allowing them to communicate relevant information
to the private sector and achieve greater actual transparency.15
In practice, there are likely to be some constraints on the degree of transparency. In par-
ticular, it may not be feasible to achieve complete opacity or perfect transparency. Suppose
that there are binding constraints on the degree of (perceived and actual) transparency such
that τ˜MIN ≤ τ˜ ≤ τ˜MAX and τMIN ≤ τ ≤ τMAX . Then, an optimum of maximum actual
transparency (τ = 1) and minimum perceived transparency (τ˜ = 0) would not be achievable.
In that case, the constrained optimum is maximum possible perceived opacity, τ˜ = τ˜MIN , and
maximum attainable actual transparency, τ = τMAX .
15Another reason for not remaining completely silent is that most central banks face accountability require-
ments, such as testimony before parliament or the publication of inflation reports.
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A key finding of the paper is that it tends to be desirable to have less perceived than actual
transparency (τ˜ < τ ). The only exception is the inflation target θ, for which τ˜ θ = τ θ is pre-
ferred by the central bank but not necessarily by society. An important practical consideration
is the extent to which it is possible to sustain systematic deviations between actual and per-
ceived transparency. In particular, if all the parameters of the model were stable it would be
possible for the private sector to learn the degree of transparency τ over time.16 For instance,
inflation reports with consistently detailed information are likely to facilitate learning about
the central bank’s inflation target transparency τ θ. However, if the accuracy of communica-
tions is variable so that σ2ε, σ2η and σ2υ are unstable, τ θ, τκ and τ s can never be learned. This is
especially relevant for verbal communications such as speeches and testimonies, because their
informativeness could easily vary from one occasion to another. Moreover, whenever τ˜ = τ is
not optimal, it is actually desirable to inhibit private sector learning and maintain transparency
misperceptions.
It could be quite challenging for central bankers to communicate with a sustained dis-
crepancy between actual and perceived transparency. Perhaps, this is where part of the ‘art’
of central banking comes in. A ‘maestro’ like Alan Greenspan manages to effectively guide
financial markets by means of statements that appear to be open to multiple interpretations.
Although financial markets definitely take cues from speeches and congressional testimony by
Greenspan, the fact that his statements are perceived to be rife with ambiguity is constructive
and prevents financial markets from reacting too strongly.
4 Conclusion
Central banks are transparent in many respects nowadays, but there is still a lot of ambiguity in
their communication. This paper shows that arcane statements by central bankers may serve an
important purpose. They create the perception of opacity and make the market more cautious
in its response to central bank communications, which reduces the volatility of private sector
expectations.
The paper models this mechanism by relaxing the strong assumption of perfect common
knowledge about the degree of central bank transparency. In practice, there is considerable
disagreement among researchers and market participants how transparent central banks are.
In addition, it would be difficult to verify the degree of transparency. So, it appears realistic
to allow the actual and perceived degrees of transparency to differ from each other. This has
the virtue that asymmetric information can be modeled regardless of the actual variability of
parameters, thereby decoupling ex ante uncertainty and ex post volatility.
16To see this, note that s and υ follow (ex post) from (2) and (23), so that σ2s, σ2υ and τs could be learned over
time. In addition, y, ξθ and ξκ could be used to estimate Var [ξθ], Cov {y, ξθ}, Var [ξκ] and Cov {y, ξκ}, from
which σ2θ, σ2ε, σ2κ and σ2η can be deduced. So, τθ and τκ would also be learnable.
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Moreover, the analysis of transparency perceptions of the private sector gives a better un-
derstanding of some of the disadvantages of transparency suggested in the literature. Although
transparency is likely to reduce private sector uncertainty, information disclosed by the cen-
tral bank could alter private sector expectations and give rise to greater economic volatility.
However, this drawback appears to be entirely due to transparency perceptions. In particu-
lar, the paper shows that actual transparency is beneficial because it reduces the noisiness of
communication, but perceived transparency could be more problematic as it makes markets
more sensitive to (noisy) information. This provides an economic rationale for transparent
central bank communications that sustain transparency misperceptions. As a result, central
banks may find it desirable to disclose information under a veil of perceived ambiguity.
The paper shows that the central bank’s optimal communication strategy is to be crystal
clear about the inflation target, but to be informative about the output gap target and supply
shocks through statements that are perceived to be opaque. In that respect, central bankers
should speak, but with mystique.
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A Appendix
This appendix analyzes two extensions to the basic model that are discussed in section 3.1.
A.1 Alternative Social Welfare Function
This section computes the optimal degrees of transparency when the social welfare function
equals (22). Substituting (7), (8) and (18) into (22) gives
W = −1
2
β
{
αθ + (1− α) (pie + κ+ s)− θ¯}2 − 1
2
(1− β) {α (θ − pie − s) + (1− α)κ− κ¯}2
= −1
2
β
{
(α + (1− α) τ˜ θ)
(
θ − θ¯)+ (1− α) τ˜ θε
+
1− α
α
[κ¯+ (α + (1− α) τ˜κ) (κ− κ¯) + (1− α) τ˜κη + αs]
}2
−1
2
(1− β){α (1− τ˜ θ) (θ − θ¯)− ατ˜ θε+ (1− α) (1− τ˜κ) (κ− κ¯)− (1− α) τ˜κη − κ¯− αs}2
Taking expectations and substituting for σ2ε and σ2η using (5) gives
E [W ] = −1
2
β
{
(α+ (1− α) τ˜ θ)2 σ2θ + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2θσ2ε
+
(1− α)2
α2
[
κ¯2 + (α + (1− α) τ˜κ)2 σ2κ + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + α2σ2s
]}
−1
2
(1− β){α2 (1− τ˜ θ)2 σ2θ + α2τ˜ 2θσ2ε + (1− α)2 (1− τ˜κ)2 σ2κ + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + κ¯2 + α2σ2s}
= −1
2
β
{(
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜ θ + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
θ
τ θ
)
σ2θ
+
(1− α)2
α2
[
κ¯2 +
(
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜κ + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
κ
τκ
)
σ2κ + α
2σ2s
]}
−1
2
(1− β)
{
α2
(
1− 2τ˜ θ + τ˜
2
θ
τ θ
)
σ2θ + (1− α)2
(
1− 2τ˜κ + τ˜
2
κ
τκ
)
σ2κ + κ¯
2 + α2σ2s
}
Differentiating with respect to the degrees of actual transparency yields:
dE [W ]
dτ θ
=
1
2
(
β (1− α)2 + (1− β)α2) τ˜ 2θ
τ 2θ
σ2θ > 0
dE [W ]
dτκ
=
1
2
(
β
(1− α)2
α2
+ (1− β)
)
(1− α)2 τ˜
2
κ
τ 2κ
σ2κ > 0
This implies that it is socially optimal to have perfect actual transparency about the central
bank’s targets (τ θ = τκ = 1).
Concerning perceived transparency, the first order conditions dE [W ] /dτ˜ θ = 0 and dE [W ] /dτ˜κ =
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0 yield
τ˜ θ =
α (α− β)
β (1− α)2 + (1− β)α2 τ θ =
α (α− β)
β (1− α) + α (α− β)τ θ
τ˜κ =
α (α− β)
β (1− α)2 + (1− β)α2 τκ =
α (α− β)
β (1− α) + α (α− β)τκ
respectively. For α ≥ β, these are the socially optimal degrees of perceived transparency,
since d2 E [W ] /dτ˜ 2θ < 0 and d2 E [W ] /dτ˜ 2κ < 0. But for α < β, the social optimum is the
corner solution τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0. So, if the central bank is not conservative, society benefits from
complete perceived opacity. Regardless of the value of β, in the social optimum the degree
of perceived transparency is strictly less than the degree of actual transparency (τ˜ θ < τ θ and
τ˜κ < τκ).
In the case of common knowledge about the degree of transparency (τ˜ θ = τ θ and τ˜κ = τκ),
E [W ] = −1
2
β
{(
α2 +
(
1− α2) τ θ)σ2θ + (1− α)2α2 [κ¯2 + (α2 + (1− α2) τκ)σ2κ + α2σ2s]
}
−1
2
(1− β){α2 (1− τ θ) σ2θ + κ¯2 + (1− α)2 (1− τκ)σ2κ + α2σ2s}
Differentiating yields
dE [W ]
dτ θ
= −1
2
[
β
(
1− α2)− (1− β)α2]σ2θ = −12 (β − α2)σ2θ
dE [W ]
dτκ
= −1
2
[
β
(1− α)2
α2
(
1− α2)− (1− β) (1− α)2] σ2κ = −12
[
β
α2
− 1
]
(1− α)2 σ2κ
Note that dE [W ] /dτ θ = dE [W ] /dτκ = 0 for β = α2, and sgn (dE [W ] /dτ θ) = sgn (dE [W ] /dτκ) =
sgn (α2 − β). Hence, τ θ = τκ = 1 is socially optimal for α2 > β, and τ θ = τκ = 0 is socially
optimal for α2 < β. So, if society attaches a sufficiently low weight to inflation stabilization
or the central bank is sufficiently conservative, the social optimum is to have transparency
about the central bank’s targets.
To summarize the results for the social welfare function (22):
- With perfect common knowledge about the degrees of transparency τ θ and τκ, it is so-
cially optimal to have maximum transparency about the central bank targets (τ θ = τκ = 1)
for α2 > β, and minimum transparency (τ θ = τκ = 0) for α2 < β.
- With transparency misperceptions, it is socially optimal to have maximum actual trans-
parency about the central bank’s targets (τ θ = τκ = 1) regardless of α and β, some perceived
opacity (0 < τ˜ θ, τ˜κ < 1) for α > β, and maximum perceived opacity (τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0) for
α ≤ β.
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A.2 Constant Central Bank Targets
This section examines optimal transparency (mis)perceptions when the central bank’s inflation
target θ and output gap target κ are constant. More precisely, the actual distributions of θ and
κ are degenerate, but the private sector still faces asymmetric information about these targets
and has the perceived (or prior) distributions θ ∼ N (θ¯, σ˜2θ), κ ∼ N (κ¯, σ˜2κ). The optimal
output gap and inflation still satisfy (7) and (8). In addition, private sector expectations are
again given by (16), (17) and (18).17 The difference with the model in section 2.2 is that the
actual values of θ and κ are now deterministic so that σ2θ = σ2κ = 0. As a result, the actual
variance of inflation expectations equals
Var [pie] = τ˜ 2θσ
2
ε +
(
1− α
α
)2
τ˜ 2κσ
2
η
This shows that the volatility of inflation expectations is increasing in perceived transparency
τ˜ θ and τ˜κ, and in the noise variances σ2ε and σ2η, so that it is essentially decreasing in actual
transparency about θ and κ.
The level of the output gap and inflation are still given by (19) and (20), but their actual
variances now equal
Var [y] = α2τ˜ 2θσ
2
ε + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + α2σ2s
Var [pi] = (1− α)2 τ˜ 2θσ2ε +
(1− α)2
α2
(1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + (1− α)2 σ2s
So, the variability of the output gap and inflation are both increasing in perceived transparency
τ˜ θ and τ˜κ, and in the noise variances σ2ε and σ2η. As a result, the output gap and inflation are
more stable when there is greater perceived opacity about the inflation and output gap targets,
and greater transparency in the communications ξθ and ξκ.
Regarding welfare effects, taking unconditional expectations based on actual distributions,
E [U ] = −1
2
1− α
α
[
α2τ˜ 2θσ
2
ε + κ¯
2 + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + α2σ2s
]
Clearly, the best outcome is obtained for maximum perceived opacity (τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0) and
maximum actual transparency (σ2ε = σ2η = 0). So, again it is optimal to have transparency
misperceptions.
The same conclusion holds for the social welfare functions in (21) and (22). Concerning
the latter, expected social welfare now equals
E [W ] = −1
2
[(
β (1− α)2 + (1− β)α2)]{τ˜ 2θσ2ε + 1α2 κ¯2 + (1− α)2α2 τ˜ 2κσ2η + σ2s
}
So again, minimum perceived transparency (τ˜ θ = τ˜κ = 0) and maximum actual transparency
(σ2ε = σ2η = 0) is optimal.
17Note that if the perceived distributions were not normal, (16) and (17) would still be the best linear predictors.
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As a result, the conclusion that it is desirable to have transparency misperceptions does
not depend on the assumption that the central bank targets θ and κ are stochastic, but it even
holds when these targets are actually deterministic.
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A.3 Transparency about Supply Shocks
This section analyzes the effect of transparency about the supply shock s, where s ∼ N (0, σ2s).
In the model of section 2, transparency about the supply shock s is immaterial because s is
only realized after the private sector has formed its inflation expectations pie. Now suppose that
the private sector receives a public signal ξs of the supply shock before it forms its inflation
expectations pie:
ξs = s+ υ (23)
where υ ∼ N (0, σ2υ), independent of ε and η. Then, the actual degree of transparency about
supply shocks is given by
τ s =
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
υ
(24)
Similarly, the perceived degree of transparency about supply shocks is given by
τ˜ s =
σ˜2s
σ˜2s + σ˜
2
υ
(25)
where σ˜2s and σ˜2υ are the private sector perceptions of the (prior) variance of s and υ, respec-
tively.
Note that the optimal degree of transparency about the inflation target θ and output gap
target κ in section 2 is independent of the variability of the supply shock s. The reason
is that σ2θ, σ2κ and σ2s enter separably in E [U ], and θ, κ and s are independent. Similarly,
the optimal degree of transparency about the supply shock is independent of the variability
of the inflation and output gap target. For simplicity, assume that the inflation target and
output gap target are deterministic and known to the private sector so that θ = θ¯, κ = κ¯ with
σ2θ = σ˜
2
θ = σ
2
κ = σ˜
2
κ = 0. Instead there is asymmetric information about the supply shock s.
The central bank still maximizes (1) subject to (2) given pie, which yields (7) and (8).
The results for imperfect common knowledge about the degree of transparency of supply
shocks are derived first. Perfect common knowledge amounts to the special case in which
there are no transparency misperceptions (τ˜ s = τ s). Taking expectations of (8) and solving
for pie gives
pie = E˜ [pi|ξs] = θ¯ +
1− α
α
(
κ¯+ E˜ [s|ξs]
)
Using (23) and (25),
E˜ [s|ξs] =
σ˜2s
σ˜2s + σ˜
2
υ
ξs = τ˜ sξs
Substituting into pie and using (23) gives
pie = θ¯ +
1− α
α
(κ¯+ τ˜ ss+ τ˜ sυ) (26)
Substituting this into (7) and (8) yields
y = − (α+ (1− α) τ˜ s) s− (1− α) τ˜ sυ
pi = θ¯ +
1− α
α
[κ¯+ (α + (1− α) τ˜ s) s+ (1− α) τ˜ sυ]
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The variance of the output gap and inflation depend on the degree of transparency:
Var [y] = (α+ (1− α) τ˜ s)2 σ2s + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2sσ2υ
=
[
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜ s + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
s
τ s
]
σ2s
Var [pi] =
(1− α)2
α2
[
(α+ (1− α) τ˜ s)2 σ2s + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2sσ2υ
]
=
(1− α)2
α2
[
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜ s + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
s
τ s
]
σ2s
using the fact that (24) implies σ2υ = 1−τsτs σ2s. This shows that the variance of the output gap
and inflation are decreasing in actual transparency τ s and increasing in perceived transparency
τ˜ s.
Not surprisingly, perceived transparency about supply shocks is harmful, whereas actual
transparency is beneficial. Formally, substitute (26) into (15) to get
U = −1
2
1− α
α
[κ¯+ (α+ (1− α) τ˜ s) s+ (1− α) τ˜ sυ]2
Taking unconditional expectations and substituting σ2ε = 1−τsτs σ
2
s gives the ex ante expected
central bank payoff
E [U ] = −1
2
1− α
α
[
κ¯2 + (α + (1− α) τ˜ s)2 σ2s + (1− α)2 τ˜ 2sσ2υ
]
= −1
2
1− α
α
[
κ¯2 +
(
α2 + 2α (1− α) τ˜ s + (1− α)2 τ˜
2
s
τ s
)
σ2s
]
As a result, for supply shocks, maximum actual transparency (τ s = 1) and minimum per-
ceived transparency (τ˜ s = 0) is optimal for the central bank. Formally, this follows from
∂ E [U ] /∂τ s =
1
2
(1−α)3
α
τ˜2s
τ2s
σ2s > 0 and ∂ E [U ] /∂τ˜ s = − (1−α)
2
α
(1−α)τ˜s+ατs
τs
σ2s < 0.
The results under common knowledge follow from imposing the restriction that τ˜ s = τ s.
The variance of the output gap and inflation are equal to
Var [y] =
[
α2 +
(
1− α2) τ s]σ2s
Var [pi] =
(1− α)2
α2
[
α2 +
(
1− α2) τ s]σ2s
This shows that greater transparency about the supply shock s increases the volatility of both
the output gap and inflation.
Not surprisingly, transparency about supply shocks is detrimental. Formally,
E [U ] = −1
2
1− α
α
[
κ¯2 +
(
α2 +
(
1− α2) τ s)σ2s]
Clearly, minimum transparency about supply shocks τ s = 0 is optimal for the central bank. It
is also socially optimal for the social welfare functions (21) and (22).
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To summarize the results concerning supply shocks s:
- With perfect common knowledge about the degree of transparency τ s, greater trans-
parency τ s increases the variability of inflation pi and the output gap y, and minimum trans-
parency (τ s = 0) is optimal for the central bank and society.
- With transparency misperceptions, greater actual transparency τ s and smaller perceived
transparency τ˜ s reduce the variability of inflation pi and the output gap y, and it is optimal
for the central bank and society to have maximum actual transparency (τ s = 1) but minimal
perceived transparency (τ˜ s = 0).
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